Wednesday, April 28, 2010

"Bigotgate": Some Initial Toughts

Three weeks in to the general election campaign and we finally have an incident worthy of the name ‘gaffe’. The cheers from the news channels are audible from here. Gordon Brown, safely ensconced in his getaway car, has been caught calling a voter who confronted him during a walkabout a “bigoted woman”, only to then realise his Sky TV microphone was still on, and his comments were being recorded by salivating producers in Wapping. As is customary, the incident must hitherto be appended with a ‘-gate’ suffix. ‘Bigotgate’ gets my vote. (The irony here of course is that whilst the original Watergate scandal was precipitated by a premier hiding recordings unbeknownst to others, here the politician is being recorded without his knowledge. It’s meta).

What impact, if any, will this have a week tomorrow? Well Labour can anticipate some awkward viewing in the evening news broadcasts for sure, but I doubt that this will leave a lasting impression.

Firstly the timing is very fortunate for Labour. Friday’s papers and tomorrow’s broadcast coverage will be dominated by the final leaders’ debate, which should stop any lasting fallout from the incident gaining a wider airing. The rules of the debate don’t allow for it to become an issue of discussion, and it would be risky for either Clegg or Cameron to score points with any swipes at Brown on the subject, as analysis of the debates so far has shown this to be a major turn-off for viewers. It’s been noticeable that both the Tories and Lib Dems have both been muted in their musings on the gaffe, which would suggest that they recognise the need not to be seen to ‘bully’ Brown.

Labour has also responded very well to the slip-up. Brown was quick to apologise on air, and the party line portraying Brown as ‘letting off steam’ is a good one. It’s obviously not the way the party would have like to do it, but it does allow them to show Brown in a more ‘human’ light. Some commentators have suggested that Brown may even benefit from the incident, much as he emerged from attacks on his letter-writing and ‘bullying’ left him strengthened. I think this might be stretching things a little: most people have seen enough of the PM to have already formed an opinion one way or another, and it seems likely to me that voters will use either the comments or Brown’s displays of contrition to reinforce their existing position. Images of Brown with his head in his hands on the Jeremy Vine show can only help to raise some sympathy for the PM, however.

I think a more dispassionate analysis of the whole incident will also help Brown to recover. Whilst it is undoubtedly a mistake, I suspect that in the cold light of day Labour advisers will admit that it could have been a lot worse. Brown didn’t swear, fly off the handle or attack the lady concerned on a personal level. It will be possible for the party to spin the incident as the PM displaying his passion for his immigration policies, and Ms Duffy’s use of phrases such as “I know you can’t attack immigrants, but…” are hardly the subtlest of dog-whistles. I actually suspect any lasting damage will stem from his attempts to blame “Sue” [Nye, Brown’s adviser] for the encounter. This seems to show Brown as incapable of taking responsibility for his own campaign. The irony is that the PM actually handled the incident reasonably well, and really shouldn’t have perceived a threat in Ms Duffy’s jibes (“all these eastern Europeans – where are they coming from?” being a rather hilarious case in point). Perhaps the Labour hierarchy will be regretting the decision not to blood their prize-fighter on the soap box earlier in the campaign: these sort of encounters really should be bread-and-butter to most seasoned campaigners.

Tuesday, April 27, 2010

Alarm Bells For Labour, But No Death Knell

Whilst it now seems likely that the polling bounce achieved by the Liberal Democrats since the first televised leaders’ debate is more than simply a flash-in-the-pan, the exact consequences what is anticipated to be a strong showing on May 6th are still something of an unknown. Nevertheless, many in the media – particularly in the Tory press - have been quick to foresee a variety of exciting post-May 7th scenarios with far reaching implications. Take Rachel Sylvester writing in this morning’s Times for example. Here the Labour Party is a spent political force staring down the barrel of electoral extinction. The apocalyptic overtones will be familiar to Tory voters with slightly longer memories than Ms Sylvester, having had to endure similar predictions for their party after the 1997 landslide. Now as then, it is best to treat these oracles with a modicum of caution.

To be fair to Ms Sylvester, she does acknowledge the similarities to 1997 herself, but argues that the rise of the Lib Dems as a challenger to Labour’s ‘progressive’ mantle means that these circumstances are exceptional. Whilst the underlying logic of this argument is sound, it is nevertheless something of a conceit that disguises a worrying reality for the Conservatives and their cheerleaders. 1983 and even 1918 have been bandied around as historic comparisons for the low-water mark of Labour’s share of the popular vote, but what has slipped by almost unnoticed is the fact that on current polling, the Tories are struggling to match their vote share to the notional 2005 result of 32.3%. Whilst the Lib Dem surge has undoubtedly hit the Labour vote, the fact that the Tories have been similarly dented underlines the fact that the centre-ground agenda is shifting more towards these ‘progressives’ than the Conservative Party would like.

That Labour would lose votes at this election was always inevitable. History shows that government has a corrosive effect on a party’s popularity over time, as the electorate hungers for fresh faces and new ideas. The fact that the last two Conservative and Labour administrations have survived so long owes as much to the Opposition veering towards their respective ideological fringes as it does to any enduring admiration for the government. Where a credible opposition has been offered, it has done well. The fact that Mr Cameron has successfully navigated his party back towards the political centre ground, and yet may still find himself barred from Downing Street proves that this election is as much of a watershed for the Conservatives as it is for either the Lib Dems or Labour.

Herein lies another important distinction between Labour’s present predicament and any worrying precedents set in 1997 and 1983. Firstly the shift in boundaries and Labour support since 1983 will mean that even if the share of the vote is comparable this time around, Labour will see enough MPs returned to Westminster to form an effective Opposition, if not a minority of coalition government. This is not to be sniffed at, even if it falls short of Labours target. Privately certain Labour MPs have been briefing that this may not be a bad election to lose, with the threat of a high budget deficit, energy shortages and ever more pressing environmental concerns likely to give the next Opposition plenty of ammunition. Secondly, it is testament to the ideological shift achieved by Blair that the MPs that are elected to the Labour benches are likely to come from the party’s moderate centre rather than its more extreme wings. This is in marked contrast to the fate suffered by the Tories in 1997, where the stripping of its marginal seats exposed a hardened Thatcherite core to the party. Consequently, whilst the Tories went through a series of right-leaning leaders under Hague, IDS and Howard, Labour can expect to find itself under the direction of a more centrist commander. That the ‘leftist’ candidate for the leadership – Jon Cruddas – earned his political spurs as deputy political secretary to Tony Blair shows just how far the party has come in making the centre ground its own. This is not something that can necessarily be said for the Tories. Whilst Cameron has worked hard to usher more moderate candidates into safe seats, there remains a lively right-wing on the Conservative back benches, and the inquest into the Cameron experiment should the Tories find themselves once again in Opposition is sure to be fierce.

Another worry that will be furrowing Tory brows at the moment will be the spectre of electoral reform. Nick Clegg has done well to bring this issue to the fore in the past week, to the extent that he now seems to be extracting concessions from both the other leaders with some regularity. Whilst David Cameron has done his best to mount a defence of FPTP, his refusal to rule out electoral reform suggests that some form of change – likely AV – may be on the table. Whilst this in itself would go some distance to undermining many traditional Conservative justifications of FPTP, more worrying for Tories will be the possibility that the reform may go even further. If a deal is struck between a third-placed labour and the Lib Dems to form the first coalition government since 1974, then a referendum on AV is unlikely to placate those who, like Clegg, take umbrage at a system that amplifies Labour’s vote share to quite such a degree. Let us not forget that under AV Labour would have actually won an even bigger majority in 2005. The Lib Dems' preferred electoral system – STV – may yet come up for discussion if the Labour Party feels the need legitimise its continuance in government. Whilst STV would, on the notional 2005 results, actually dent the Tory vote to a lesser extent that AV, it will worry Tories, as it makes it much harder for the party to overcome the ‘progressive’ Labour, Lib Dem and Green bloc that will benefit from the reform.

So whilst the current polling should be ringing alarm bells in Labour’s Victoria Street headquarters, and should invigorate what has been a flat Labour campaign thus far, it should not yet be seen as the death knell for the party. Whereas the readiness of Tory commentators to read the polling evidence in this light is, in the context of an election campaign, entirely understandable, Conservatives should not feel immune to the fallout of the Lib Dem squeeze. If anything, the implications for them could be even more dire.

Thursday, April 22, 2010

This Brave New World

If ever proof were needed for Harold Wilson’s famous adage that ‘a week is a long time in politics’, surely we have been given it by the lorry-load since last Thursday. Indeed it now seems more appropriate to note that 90 minutes is a long time in politics. The energy, unpredictability and sheer bloody excitement that has been leant to the campaign trail in the wake of Nick Clegg’s meteoric rise - afforded by the first ever televised leaders’ debate – has had politicians and commentators alike scrabbling for ‘meaning’, whilst a torrent of lazy volcano metaphors fly from the pen’s of the lobby press pack.

But how do we analyse this apparent sea-change in British politics? Whilst it is untrue to claim as some have done that the Liberal Democrats have never topped the polls before – they did in fact lead some in the wake of their stunning capture of Brent East at a 2003 by-election – it has certainly never happened this close to an election before. Couple this to an already very tight race, and we do indeed find ourselves in uncharted territory. So where to begin? Well we can start by being reasonably confident in asserting that the Lib Dems are not going to form a majority government. Indeed despite the fact that a number have polls placed them at the top of the pile, they are unlikely to get many more than 100 seats at best, and will remain in a fairly distant third. Looking through the list of Lib Dem targets, you notice that the truly marginal seats are rather thin on the ground. The number of seats requiring a swing of less than 5% for a Lib Dem gain it is just 32, which compares to 87 for the Tories and even 50 for Labour. But that doesn’t mean that this ‘surge’ (as it is now uniformly known) is insignificant, even under our archaic voting system. In particular it will dent Tory hopes of making significant progress in the South West, something that was widely seen as a pre-requisite for a Conservative majority come May 7th. Labour strategists warn that this could be nullified by a number of losses to the ‘yellow peril’ in the north of England, but on the face of it at least, the current turn of events would seem to harm the Tories more than Labour. I say this with caution, as much depends on how these national polling trends (the uniform national swing) translate on the ground. It would seem to make sense, for instance, to say that the Lib Dems might receive less of a boost in the South West, where the party is already well established and their profile relatively high, than in other areas of the country. With that caveat duly noted, it is also true to say that only eight of the Lib Dems top 25 target seats are currently held by Labour, a statistic that will no doubt haunt CCHQ.

Despite criticisms from all quarters, Gordon Brown has actually played this new political field reasonably well. He has moved to present himself in a similar ‘progressive’ mould to Clegg in order to shore up any waverers in his party’s core vote, whilst allowing the Lib Dem pretender to steal Cameron’s mantle of ‘change’, dividing the vote for what is a tough crowd to win back to the government’s cause. The polls haven’t necessarily reflected this, with Labour falling back almost as much as the Tories have, but it might yet prove influential in shaping the electorate’s lasting impressions of the three men. Naturally this will infuriate Labour MPs in Lib Dem marginals, but given the concerted effort being made in the Tory press to tarnish Clegg’s reputation, there remains enough room for candidates to manoeuvre in these seats.

These attacks on Clegg and his party are themselves an interesting phenomenon, not least because of their timing. In the aftermath of the first few polling results after the first leaders’ debate, there was much speculation in the media about how long this Lib Dem ‘bounce’ would last. The fact that one week on the Lib Dems still find themselves in the mix is perhaps as surprising as the initial jump itself, and the current bout of mud-slinging in the right-wing press testament to the concern this is causing senior Tories. Whether these slurs stick or not – and there is already a successful Twitter campaign parodying the hysteria – I’m doubtful whether the Lib Dems can maintain their current lofty status. However it is worth noting that with postal ballots due to be sent out soon, now is not a bad time at all for the party to find itself en vogue.

The reason for my doubts is the remaining two televised debates: that which giveth doth also taketh away, to paraphrase one best-seller. Brown and Cameron will no doubt have learned the lessons from last week, and we can be sure that all questioners will now be addressed by name, whilst responses will be delivered to the camera. Clegg will also find himself under much greater scrutiny not just from his two adversaries, but also the viewing public, with whom his novelty will have waned in a week of wall-to-wall press coverage. And Lib Dem policies on foreign affairs – the subject of tonight’s debate – are hardly populist tub-thumpers. Greater EU integration, any one? Unilateral nuclear disarmament, perhaps? Clegg will have to be at his best to prevent a tabloid bloodbath. The economy debate on the 29th will of course allow him to play the ‘Vince’ card, until recently the Lib Dems’ trump. But the danger here is that they’ll appear too close to Labour on policy, allowing Cameron to play the ‘outsider’. That would be a disaster for Clegg with polling day only a week away.

So whilst the current volatility makes predicting the make up of the next Parliament something of a folly, pundits do seem to be agreed that as the polls stand, we’re heading into hung parliament territory. This throws up yet more intrigue. When the campaign kicked off, there was something approaching a consensus on the Lib Dem and Labour benches backing a referendum on the adoption of the Alternative Vote electoral system, although this was widely seen as a ‘first step’ on the reform path by Lib Dems rather than an end in itself. But if Labour do remain the largest party in the Commons on a share of the vote in line with their current third position, will the Lib Dems sense their moment to push through a more radical proposal for their preferred Single Transferable Vote? This could have absolutely monumental repercussions for the Conservatives, who have historically benefited from a less divided vote in the centre-right. Could the advent of Cameron, who was until last week the saviour of the modern Tories, actually be the party’s swan song as the ‘natural party of government’?

All of these questions will become clear in 14 days time. But with so much still up in the air, a week in politics suddenly feels like no time at all.

Wednesday, April 14, 2010

TV Debates: It's Not The Swinging Sixties Anymore

With the ritualised policy briefing that is the modern manifesto launch out of the way for the three main parties, the collective attention of the Wetminster-village-in-diaspora is now firmly fixed on the forthcoming TV leaders' debates. Or to properly prefix them, the 'historic TV leaders' debates'. Obviously these have been hotly anticipated by politicos, amongst whom they are often assumed to be an electoral game-chager. Being a novelty in British politics, it is difficult to know whether or not this will be the case, but I can think of some good reasons to be more cautious in evaluating their potential influence.

The first port of call for many feature writers in the media has naturally been to look across the water to our North American and European cousins, where TV debates are an established part of the electoral process. And more often than not, this will lead to an anectdote about the 1960 Presidential debate, where a youthful JFK outshone the sweaty, grey Richard Nixon. It is taken as a given that this was a pivotal moment in the race to the White House, and rightly so. But that doesn't mean we can make a direct comparison with the 2010 British General Election. Firstly Nixon displayed a basic ignorance of the medium - his refusal of make-up famously contributing to his deathly palour on the box - that none of today's leaders could ever be accused of. Even criticisms of Gordon Brown's manufactured, knee-jerk telly smile are the result of over-engineering his media presence, not the reverse. Whilst Brown might claim that he is meeting 'ordinary people' to prepare for the debate, it is nevertheless safe to assume that all three participants will have had hour upon hour of training from their aides to cover every conceivable eventuality thrown up by the debates. Secondly one must factor in the different circumstances in which these debates are taking place. The reason Nixon's appearance played such a pivotal role in the 1960 election was that many people weren't used to seeing politicians on TV. Today, we are saturated with media appearances by politicians of every persuasion, and viewers are unlikely to be surprised by what they see. The novelty of these debates is found in the format, rather than the medium itself.

So, how do I see the debates going? Early exchanges in the campaign thus far have indicated that skirmishes might be centred around figures and 'costed promises'. All the parties will attempt to show that the others can't pay for their policies. The Conservatives have the most to lose on this front, as current polling indicates that they are the party seen as the most 'honest' by voters. The Lib Dems have been bold in including detailed financial projections in an appendix to their manifesto, which has so far backfired as commentators present their front bench representatives with all sorts of awkward sums that undermine some of the grander claims they make for the policies. The details of these economic promises will probably go over the heads of most voters, but if the accusations of 'reckless' and 'uncosted' spending sticks to all parties, it could be Labour that stands to gain the most. If the electorate fins itself with a collective economic headache come polling day, they might yet stick with the policies that have hauled the country out of recession.

Friday, March 12, 2010

A (not so) quick guide to polling in the 2010 election

You know that election season is close when the weekend papers begin to fill their front pages with talk of ‘swings’ and ‘top-line figures’, whilst those in Westminster begin to talk in reverent tones of those quasi-mythical oracles of modern politics: the pollsters. But the art of reading political tea leaves is a difficult one. With different polling companies often producing divergent results, and different analysts offering conflicting opinions on what each poll means, it can often be difficult to know who to believe. This guide is intended to help you navigate the treacherous waters of the opinion poll, and equip you with the knowledge required to make your own informed judgements.

A very short introduction:

Polling is usually carried out by a specialist company, more often than not under the direction of a commissioning organisation, such as a newspaper, political party or pressure group. Most polling companies will have their own methodology for gathering responses and selecting a representative sample for analysis, although the questions asked vary depending on the demands of the commissioner. The largest polling companies in Britain are YouGov, ICM, Ipsos-MORI, Populus and ComRes, although the field contains a number of newcomers since the last general election, including BPIX, Angus Reid and Harris. Many national newspapers have long-standing relationships with a particular polling company, such as The Guardian’s with ICM, The Independent’s with ComRes and that between YouGov and The Sun and The Telegraph.

Methodology:

Polling is an inexact science which can often produce contrary results. For example, Angus Reid polls have consistently shown a Conservative lead of between 12 and 16 points since the turn of the year, whilst YouGov has placed the Tory lead between 2 and 12 points over the same period. What can account for this difference?

At heart, of course, polling companies all have a common objective: to gather opinion from a representative sample on a given topic in order to highlight underlying trends. However the ways in which the pollsters approach this goal differs from company to company.

The first major dividing line is drawn in the ways in which different pollsters gather their data. Certain companies, including YouGov, Harris and Angus Reid, use online surveys completed by a registered panel to form their sample. Other companies, such as ComRes and Populus, use telephone interviews, and a declining number still use face-to-face interviews, including TNS BMRB. Still others, ICM included, use a mix of online, telephone and face-to-face interviews to inform their polls. Ipsos-MORI switched from a face-to-face methodology to a telephone-based research method after the London mayoral election of 2008, citing criticisms that the face-to-face technique gave disproportionate weighting to public-sector workers.

A more complicated difference is found in the ways in which different companies ‘weight’ their samples. Weighting is the process through which the opinions collected in a poll are exaggerated or underplayed depending upon the stated allegiances and demographics of the respondent, in order to bring the sample in line with the nationwide equivalents, thus producing a ‘representative sample’. All pollsters do this, but the factors that are chosen to weight the sample vary from company to company.

Most companies will use demographic data - such as age, race, sex, income, and employment status - collected from their panel to weight their responses. This helps to iron out any anomalies that might be thrown up by their sampling methods. For example, it would probably be accurate to assume that a face-to-face survey conducted during the daytime might catch a disproportionately high number of unemployed people, as those in work are not available to be questioned. Equally, online surveys might over-represent higher income groups, as they might be presumed to have better access to the requisite technology.

Given that this sort of weighting is fairly standard however, it is unlikely that this is a major source of divergence between polling companies. More contentious is the use of political data as a weighting factor. Political weighting – which uses factors such as party membership, voting history and newspaper readership to balance the sample – is applied differently by most polling organisations, and has evolved in order to address discrepancies observed between the data collected by pollsters and historical actualities. Political weighting became widespread after pollsters suffered a disastrous 1992 General Election campaign, where predictions of a Labour victory were all but unanimous across the companies. A subsequent Market Research Society (MRS) inquiry found that respondents were more likely to refuse to reveal their voting history and intention if they associated themselves with ‘unfashionable’ parties (a phenomenon known as the ‘Spiral of Silence’ in polling circles). Another common problem is deciding upon how to include the opinions expressed by those who are uncertain whether or not they will vote; they often represent a significant proportion of the sample, but their responses are clearly not as valuable as those who are certain of their intention to vote.

The methods used to address these challenges vary depending on the polling organisation. Populus, ComRes and ICM all use a respondent’s vote at the last election to determine their weight in relation to voting intention. ICM, MORI, ComRes and Populus also all use the stated likelihood to vote as a weighting factor, whilst YouGov and Angus Reid factor in newspaper readership.

However weighting on these terms is not as simple as it might seem. Statisticians have noticed an undeniable tendency for ‘false recall’ amongst a significant proportion of any given survey panel. False recall is the collection of inaccurate data due to the respondent’s inability to remember their own voting history, or their desire to distort their previous voting record. A good example of the latter is a hypothetical Conservative supporter, who voted tactically for the Lib Dems at the previous election, but wishes to express their support for the Tories. False recall can therefore also compound the differences between survey methods, as online polling can store data pertaining to an individual’s responses over long periods without fear of inaccuracy, whereas telephone and face-to-face interviews rely to a much greater extent upon the honesty and memory of their respondents. ICM, Populus and ComRes all adjust their survey results to account for false recall. Furthermore, all polling companies test their methodologies against historical data.

A final methodological point to bear in mind is the order in which different pollsters place their questions. Although notoriously difficult to quantify, research has shown that responses to a given question can be shaped by whether it is placed at the beginning, middle or end of a survey. Of particular note in this respect is the placement of the voting intention question. All companies aside from Angus Reid ask this ‘headline question’ first, which could explain why Angus Reid has returned such divergent results.

So who should I believe?

The somewhat predictable response to this commonly-asked question is that there is no simple answer.

However in the two most recent national elections, YouGov has had the most success by final polling, judging the eventual 2008 London mayoral result perfectly when most other pollsters had predicted a victory for Livingstone, and getting the 2009 European election result to within an average margin for error of 1%, compared to second-placed Populus’ 1.6%.

Past form is not a fail-proof yardstick for measuring likely success in the up-coming election however, for a couple of reasons. Firstly, YouGov, like most other polling companies, have made tweaks to their methodology which has not yet been tested against a real election result. The different constituencies and boundary changes can also disrupt the local weighting done by pollsters in a general election campaign, especially where this changes the rules of engagement for tactical voters.

It’s also worth noting that a general election campaign is a different beast to the local and European equivalents, where shifts in focus between emerging policies, scandals and intrigue can produce a much more pronounced swing in the polls. Having duly noted this, YouGov has nevertheless been widely credited with producing the most accurate voting intention figures ahead of the 2001 and 2005 elections.

Ipsos-MORI’s policy of only including respondents who describe themselves as certain to vote in their samples mean that their top-line figures are often more volatile than other pollsters. Although their most recent return of a 5 point Tory advantage is broadly in-line with other polls, since 2008 they have recorded a 28 point lead for the Conservatives, and have seen successive month-on-month swings of 11 points over the last six months.

However MORI did enjoy a very successful 2005 election, getting the Conservative and Liberal Democrat vote shares spot on, and missing both Labour and Others by 2 points. Similarly, Populus correctly predicted Labour and Lib Dem vote shares in their final 2005 poll, placing the Conservatives to within a 1% margin of error. ICM has historically overstated Labour support during general election campaigns.

A word of caution:

You can, to paraphrase George Canning, prove anything with statistics except the truth. Many an over-enthusiastic commentator has eagerly extrapolated headline-friendly conclusions from opinion polls, only to find that on closer inspection the detail does not bear them out. The pitfalls in polling are numerous – here are some of the more common snares to avoid.

The golden rule for analysts is to make sure that in charting the fortunes of parties through the polls, one only ever compares like for like. Given the differences in methodology outlined above, it would be extremely misleading to describe, for example, Labour support moving from 28% in one ICM poll to 34% in a later YouGov offering as a jump of 6 points for the party. ICM polls should only be compared to earlier ICM polls, and YouGov to preceding YouGov polls. Quite apart from anything else, this should give a much less volatile picture of poll movements, and make it easier to chart the long-term trends.

It would also be a mistake to read voting intention figures as directly comparable to the make up of any future Parliament. Due to the mysteries of the boundaries system, Labour requires a much smaller share of the popular vote to secure a working majority than the Tories do. Broadly speaking, the Conservatives need a lead of around 9 points in the polls to be confident of forming a majority government, and even then they are susceptible to being scuppered by a strong Lib Dem showing. The reasons for this apparent bias can be found in the over-representation of certain areas, notably Wales, the often ‘clustered’ nature of Tory support, and the greater propensity for Lib Dem and Labour voters to vote tactically against the Tories.

To complicate matters further, top-line figures fail to take account of the regional variations that often decide elections. Polls are weighted to reflect national data, when in fact it is usually a relatively small number of marginal seats that decide the eventual outcome of a general election. This is particularly pertinent in the 2010 election, where the Conservatives have invested vast sums – controversially backed by Michael Ashcroft’s donations - in campaigning in marginal seats. If this strategy were to pay off, the Tories could notionally win enough seats to form a government with a narrower lead than might be expected in the national polls. The key piece of data here is the swing in voting intention against the swing required by the challenger to unseat the incumbent. In 2010, the bulk of Labour’s key marginals are in the south east of England, whilst the Tories will also need to make in-roads into a number of target seats held by Lib Dems in the south west if they are to enjoy a healthy majority. Top-line figures therefore often fail to reflect the nuances at a regional level that can have a profound effect upon the eventual result.

It’s perhaps not surprising that the voting intention by party figures should grab the headlines, but it is also worth taking these within some kind of context. For instance, whilst voting intention figures widely predicted a Labour victory prior to the 1992 general election, John Major retained a lead over Neil Kinnock in his personal approval ratings throughout the campaign, mirroring the eventual result much more accurately. Similarly, party ratings in individual policy areas can prove a useful barometer should a single area come to dominate the election coverage, as the economy threatens to do in 2010. Whilst it is undoubtedly easier to spot these trends with the benefit of hindsight, looking beyond the top-line figures can help analysts spot anomalous figures.

Another bugbear for pollsters is the leading question; often a favourite of pressure groups with an agenda to push. Examples of such shady dealings include prompting - offering the respondent an option where it isn’t merited, and artificially shifting the weight of possible answers in order to favour a given outcome (as in ‘would you say this issue is extremely important, very important, important, not important’). Mercifully these false positives are easily spotted with a quick glance through the polling tables, but this is unlikely to stop the commissioning organisation from formulating some sensationalist headlines, which are often regurgitated without thought in the media.

Wednesday, March 10, 2010

Chilcot-en Gains? Have Lessons Been Learned Over Iraq?

In early 2003, as the march to war in Iraq began to accelerate, I can remember reading an excellent report in The Guardian’s G2 supplement by someone formerly in the military’s top brass, whose name now escapes me. The reason the article has stayed with me seven years on is that, at a time when the commentary in the media churned out claim and counter-claim about Iraq’s presumed stockpile of WMDs, this lone voice was urging the west to consider something that was all but ignored at the time: Iraq’s domestic politics.

Iraq was disarmed after the first Gulf War in 1991 and, the argument ran, if we are to go to war over the country’s weapons of mass destruction, the burden of proving their existence falls upon the invading powers. Granted, Iraq had failed to comply with UN weapons inspections, but one should consider the unenviable position Saddam Hussein found himself in through the late 1990s and early 2000s. His outward shows of defiance not only masked his weakening hold of power in Iraq, but were actually the only thing keeping the dictator from losing popular support, itself the only thing propping up his regime. UN incursions into Iraq not only undermined Saddam’s authority, but also placed pressure on him to sate the anti-western sentiment held by many Iraqis.

Fast-forward to 2010, and what has struck me most about the latest bout of hand-wringing at the Chilcot inquiry is the extent to which the terms of the debate are still grounded in these pre-war assumptions. Gordon Brown asserted in his evidence that Saddam ‘did not disclose, far less dismantle any of his weapons’, a claim that was not questioned by a single member of the Chilcot panel. Even where mistakes have been admitted, politicians have begged exoneration on the basis that their decisions were made in good faith. Take Tony Blair, for example, claiming that ‘What I actually said in the foreword [to the September 2002 Iraq dossier] was that I believed it beyond doubt [that Iraq possessed WMDs] and I did believe it’

Politicians, of course, are not exactly known for their heart-felt apologies. However what worries me most about the ongoing Chilcot inquiry is that I’ve seen very little evidence that lessons have been learned from the whole debacle. David Miliband, for example, claimed in his evidence yesterday that ‘It was no good the UN passing strong resolutions if it was then feeble in its follow-up.’ But how could Iraq have complied with the demands of the resolution referred to by Mili senior – Security Resolution 1441, the final request made by the UN for Iraq to disarm – if the intelligence that suggested that Iraq was ‘armed’ in the first place was at fault? If this inquiry has revealed anything, it is that the burden of proof should have fallen on the US and the UK to substantiate the claims they made in the build up to war. Judging from what I have seen, I can’t see that the present Government would react any differently if it were presented by a similar scenario in the future.

Tuesday, February 9, 2010

Does The Green Party Really Want AMS?

There's an interesting piece that's just been published over at the New Statesman, retrofitting the 2005 election result with various reforms to the voting system. With the Alternative Vote (AV) system currently en vogue with the Prime Minister, much of the attention given to the NS article will undoubtedly highlight the strengthening of Labour's position under this system.

From the Green Party's perspective however, I found myself wondering whether events have overtaken its long-term support for the Additional Member System (AMS). The Party has justified its position on electoral reform by highlighting the many merits of the system, which dovetails nicely with its policies on localism and engagement. These are all good reasons to support AMS, but I'm sure political expedience was also a key factor in the Party's reform agenda: it could justifiably expect to win more seats in Wesminster under AMS than under FPTP.

And superficially at least, this is a conclusion that is upheld by the Statesman's report, in which AMS is the only system through which the Green Party would have won representation in the Commons in 2005. However with Caroline Lucas now favourite to take Brighton Pavillion at the next election under FPTP, I wonder whether there isn't more to consider here. It's worth noting that under AMS in 2005, the Green Party would only have won 2 seats, the same number as the BNP and 8 fewer than UKIP. This could be damaging for the Party's image: it doesn't want to be seen as an 'extremist' party operating on the fringes of society in the same way that the BNP does. In contrast, if Lucas is able to win the Greens' first seat in the spring, they can again claim to be the fourth largest party (excluding nationalists) in the country, as they will have achieved something that not even UKIP have done (UKIP's only current MP - Bob Spink - is a Tory turncoat). It might not mirror the Party's egalitarian ideal, but being part of a more exclusive legislative body might give the Greens more political weight than being one of a number of 'minor' parties to hold more than one seat.

The caveat here, of course, is that the NS research doesn't account for how a change in the voting system might affect a change in people's voting intentions. Greens might justifiably point out that their party may attract a larger share of the vote if the electorate thought that a Green vote carried more weight under AMS than under FPTP. Reason suggests that the Party may well have suffered from tactical voting and 'wasted-vote syndrome' in the past. But unless Labour backbenchers can force a stunning change of direction in the Commons this afternoon, it seems likely that the terms of such debates as these will continue to be grounded in little more than conjecture.